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Abstract
In this paper, I review the evolution and characteristics of South Korea’s financial
system since the early 1960s.  The South Korean experiences are then used to argue that
the distribution of the knowledge about valuable businesses varies with the stage of
economic development.  This has implications for the design of financial system.  In the
early development stage when low labor cost is the main competitive advantage, it is easy
for everyone to see what businesses will create value.  A centralized financial system is
not likely to significantly misallocate resources.  Government-directed credit allocation
can be justified in some cases.  In the more advanced development stage when the labor
cost advantage disappears and the knowledge about the technologically advanced
products becomes widely dispersed, a financial system that promotes security trading is
more likely to guide efficient resource allocation.
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21.  Introduction
An efficient financial system is said to be one that channels financial resources
into the most productive businesses.  What then are the key aspects of a financial system
that will allowed it to achieve this goal?  How should financial structures be changed to
accommodate the needs of economic development in different stages?  While these are
very important questions for policy purposes, it is very difficult to reach general
conclusions on these questions.1  Therefore, a careful look at the experiences of different
countries can provide some useful insights if not definitive answers.
For the past 40 years or so, South Korea has largely been viewed as a successful
economic development story until the recent crisis.  Its experiences and development
policies have been admired and emulated by other developing countries. In this paper, I
will examine the growth experiences of South Korea in light of its financial system
efficiency.  More specifically, I will try to see if the South Korean experiences can shed
some insights on the theory of comparative financial systems and if there is any lesson
for other developing economies.
The South Korean financial system and structure seem to have some desirable
characteristics: concentrated family stock ownership that can reduce the agency
problems; high leverage ratios that can act as disciplining device; corporate debt mostly
coming from financial institutions that can make bankruptcy less costly (see Stulz 1998).
These very same characteristics, however, have also been shapely criticized in recent
years.  Without a clear conceptual framework, it is very difficult to evaluate the pros and
                                                            
1Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) classify over 60 countries’ financial systems.  They identify a number
of potential determinants of financial structure.  See also Levine (1997) for a survey of the literature and
many related issues.
3cons of these characteristics and the role they play in South Korea’s economic
development.
In recent years, an information-based theory of comparative financial systems is
emerging (see, for example, Allen 1993, Boot and Thakor 1997, Dow and Gorton 1997,
and Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999).  This theory is based on the idea that the
information needed for making firms’ investment decisions is decentralized and dispersed
in the economy.  No one, including the firms’ managers, has all the information
necessary to make correct investment decisions.2  This is particularly true for firms whose
products are more affected by technology changes.  In a market-based financial system,
the dispersed information will be reflected in security prices through trading.  Security
prices can then provide signals for making efficient resource allocation decisions.  In an
article analyzing the East Asian financial crisis, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that the
importance of price signals is a key factor in comparing the efficiency of market-based
and relationship-based systems.  When price signals are relatively important, the market-
based system should be favored.
In this paper, I will advance this line of reasoning a step further.  I will argue that
the value of having the price signals varies with the stages of economic development.  In
the earlier stage of development when a country’s competitive advantage lies mainly in
lower labor costs, it is relatively easy for everyone to see certain businesses will create
value.  Through intervention, a government can quickly mobilize financial resources into
these industries without making big strategic mistakes.  Government-directed financing
can alleviate the underinvestment problems often associated with financing by the private
                                                            
2 The empirical evidence from initial public offerings is consistent with this view.  See, for example,
Jagadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993).
4sector due to asymmetric information about asset-in-place (Myers and Majluf 1984) or
about management quality.
When the labor cost advantage disappears as the country grows richer, it becomes
more difficult to see what products will create value.  This is especially the case when the
country moves into products whose demands and supplies, hence revenues, are more
affected by new technological innovation.  For these products, the information about their
future profits is likely to be uncertain and dispersed.  This is the stage at which a financial
system that relies more on financing through traded securities works better.
The argument above is motivated by the South Korean experiences.  Therefore,
the discussion below will begin with a description of South Korea’s growth experiences
and the characteristics of its financial system.  In discussing South Korean chaebols, we
will often use Daewoo, the second largest one, as an example because a lot of
information about it was made public during its recent liquidity crisis in the summer of
1999.
2.  Government-Led Credit Allocation and South Korea’s Economic Growth
Substantive economic development in South Korea really started in the early
1960s when the South Korean government embarked on a series of five-year economic
development plans.  In the ensuing four decades, South Korea invested heavily and
experienced tremendous economic growth as a result (see Table 1). In 1961, the
commercial banks in South Korea were nationalized.  The government used its control of
banks to mobilize financial resources and pursue its export-oriented industrialization
policy.
5In the 60s, most of South Korea’s export products came from agricultural and
light industries.  The government directed its heavily subsidized policy loans into these
industries.  In the 70s, the government shifted its focus to the heavy industries. During the
Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Drive from 1972 to 1979, the government
encouraged firms to invest in industries such as machinery, steel, petrochemicals,
shipbuilding, automobiles and construction.  These firms had access to the subsidized
policy loans from banks.  In the late 70s, policy loans accounted for nearly 80% of
domestic credit (Hao, Hunter and Yang 1999).
Indicator 1962-73 1974-82 1983-92 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth Rates
Real GDP 8.7 7.1 9.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1
Manufacturing sector 18.9 12.7 11.8 5 10.4 10.8 7.4
Real export 29.7 13 11.8 11.3 16.5 24 14.1
Share in GDP
Agriculture 32.7 19.9 10.3 7 7.1 6.5 6.3
Mining and Manufacturing 20.8 28.7 30.7 27.3 27.2 27.1 26.1
Other 46.5 51.3 59 65.7 65.7 66.4 67.6
Ratios to GNP
Exports 13.8 31.6 34.9 29.3 30.1 33.1 32.4
Fixed investment 19.8 29.8 32.4 36.2 36 36.9 37.1
Current accounts surplus 1/ -4 -5.3 1.2 0.1 -1.2 -2 -5
Monetary growth rate (M2) 26.3 22.5 14.5 16.6 18.7 15.6 15.8
Inflation rate (CPI) 12.3 15.1 4.8 4.8 6.2 4.5 5
Unemployment rate 5.8 4.1 3.1 2.8 2.4 2 2
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Year book,various issues,
             Reprinted from Borensztein and Lee 1999 IMF Working Paper. 
1/ Current account surplus includes net current transfers from the rest of the world. 
Table 1. Korea Economic Indicators, 1962-96 
(In percentage, period average)
6By the early 1980s, the effectiveness of the policy of government-directed
economic growth seemed to have diminished.  The government tried to reduce the extent
of its control on credit allocation.  From 1981 to 1983, commercial banks were
privatized.  The interest rate gap between policy loans and general loans was almost
completely eliminated in 1982 (see Cho and Kim 1997).
Nevertheless, the industrial policy of the South Korean government in the 60s and
70s helped firms in the favored industries to expand into large conglomerate groups: the
chaebols.  For example, one of the five largest chaebols, Daewoo, was founded in 1967
as a modest trading company producing and exporting textile products.  Its exports grew
from USD 580,000 in 1967 to USD 40 million in 1972.  From 1973 to 1975, Daewoo
diversified its business into construction, financial services, garment manufacturing and
leather goods.  From 1976 to 1981, Daewoo entered into heavy industries by acquiring
businesses in shipbuilding, machinery and automobile.  From 1982 to 1987, Daewoo
diversified into electronics and telecommunications.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Daewoo
also pursued a vigorous geographic expansion strategy.  It made major investments in
Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, China, India, Iran,
Egypt, and Indonesia, primarily for the production of motor vehicles.  Manufacturing
base for home appliances and consumer electronics were established in UK, France,
China, Vietnam, Mexico and Latin America.
As the South Korean economy grows, its major product lines have shifted from
agricultural and light industries, to heavy and chemical industries, and then to the
technologically sophisticated electronics and telecommunication industries (this could be
7seen from Table 1).  Substantial financial resources have been invested in these
industries.  As we look at the returns on capital invested over the years, however, the
picture is not as uni-dimensional as the growth rates.  Several ways of looking at the
statistics seem to suggest that the return on capital investment and the profitability of
Korean firms has declined over the years as the product lines were upgraded (see Tables
2, 3, and 4).
Presumably, South Korean firms moved into new product lines because of their
higher returns. This decline in profitability is therefore puzzling.  We offer one
explanation of this decline later.  Before we do that, we need to look at the ownership and
financial structure of large chaebols.
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
RKA 24.8 25.6 21.9 22.3 23.1 19.6 17.6 14.3 11.4 12.5 12.1
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1972-79 1980-90
RKA 14.4 16.2 16.7 18.7 17.1 14.2 12.7 10 21.1 14.2
Source: The Rates of Return on Capital in the United States, Japan, and Korea, 1972-1990, Sung Yeung Kwack
1994, Korean Economy At a Crossroad, Westport, Connectinut: Praeger. 
Table 2.  Rate of Return on Capital in Manufacturing of Korea(%)
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Median ROA 0.044 0.039 0.041 0.04 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.031 0.037
Source:Corporate Growth, Financing, and Risks in the Decade before East Asia's Financial Crisis, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
1998, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Table 3. Real ROA in Local Currency (EBIT over Total Assets, Adjusted for Inflation)
8Year 1980-94 1980-83 1991-94
Median ROA 0.09 0.11 0.07
Source: How Intensive is Competition in the Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Corporate Rates of Return from
 Nine Emerging Markets, Glen, Singh, and Matthias, 1999, IMF Working Paper
 Table 4. ROA of Top Listed Korean Manufacturing Corporations
3.  The Characteristics of Ownership and Financial Structures of Chaebols
While the South Korean financial system is characterized by the government
control of credit allocation to pursue export-oriented industrialization policy, the
ownership structure and financial structure of South Korean firms have the following
characteristics:
1.  High financial leverage.   The debt to equity ratios of Korean firms are
extremely high as compared to their counterparts in the US and Japan (Table 5). The
average debt to equity ratio of the top 30 chaebols was 4.5 in 1996.  The top five
chaebols’ debt to equity ratios are shown in Table 6.
It should be noted that much of the borrowing is done through financial
intermediaries (banks and non-bank financial institutions).  A growing number of firms
issued corporate bonds in recent years.  However, the bond market is still
underdeveloped, lacking an effective secondary market (see Kim and Koo 1999).
Therefore, most of chaebols’ debt is not traded.
9Taiwan Province 
Year Manufacturing 30 chaebols 1/ United States Japan  of China
1991 307 403 147 209 98
1992 319 426 168 202 93
1993 295 398 175 202 88
1994 303 403 167 196 87
1995 287 388 160 196 86
1996 317 450 154 187 ..
Sources: Fair Trade Commission; Financial Statements Analysis, Bank of Korea; U.S.Census Bureau
 Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining, and Trade Corporations; and The Quarterly 
Report of Enterprises, Ministry of Finance, Japan
Quoted from Republic of Korea: Selected Issues, Jeanne Gobat, 1998, IMF Staff Country Report
1/ Nonfinancial subsidiaries of 30 largest chaebols.
Table 5. Korea-International Comparison of Average Debt-Equity Ratios
in the Manufacturing Sector (In percent)
Korean
Equity Debt Debt/Equity Ratio %
Hyundai 10,670 61,745 578.7
Daewoo 9,055 42,736 472
Samsung 13,492 50,044 370.9
LG 8,491 42,944 505.8
SK 5,109 23,910 468
Source: Fair Trade Commission; Quoted from Republic of Korea: Selected Issues,
            Jeanne Gobat, 1998, IMF Staff Country Report
Table 6. Korea: Capital Structure of the Five Largest Chaebols, 1997
(Excluding Financial Institutions; End of Period)
(In billions of won)
2.  High ownership concentration.  From Table 7, we can see that the average in-
group ownership concentration of top 30 chaebols in 1996 is 44.1%  (60.4% for the
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largest chaebol, Hyundai).3  Unlike the Japanese keiretsu, each chaebol is typically
controlled by a family.  The family exercises its control through cross-shareholding
among its listed and unlisted affiliates of the chaebol group.  This is done in part to avoid
publishing consolidated financial statements because a company did not have to produce
a consolidated financial statement if it owned less than 30% or more of another company
in Korea (Gobat 1998).  Table 8 shows the extent of cross-shareholding in the top five
chaebols more recently.  Reported is the ratio of equity investments in sister firms in a
chaebol group to the net worth of the group (in book value) as of April 1, 1999.  As we
can see, cross-shareholding is still very significant. For the largest chaebol, Hyundai, the
ratio is 73.9%.
1983 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Top 30 57.2 56.2 46.2 45.4 46.9 46.1 43.4 42.7 43.3 44.1
  Family 17.2 15.8 14.7 13.7 13.9 12.6 10.3 9.7 10.5 10.3
Subsidiaries 40 40.4 32.5 31.7 33 33.5 33.1 33 32.8 33.8
Hyundai 81.4 79.9 - 60.2 67.8 65.7 57.8 61.3 60.4 -
Daewoo 70.6 56.2 - 49.1 50.4 48.8 46.9 42.4 41.4 -
Samsung 59.5 56.5 - 51.4 53.2 58.3 52.9 48.9 49.3 -
LG 30.2 41.5 - 35.2 38.3 39.7 38.8 37.7 39.7 -
Note: 'In-group ownership' concentration is an weighted average (where the weight is the size of capital) for each business group 
of the family ownership shares plus those of subsidiaries.
Source: Yoo and Lim(1999), Korean Development Institute
Table 7. In-Group Ownership  Concentration  (%)
                                                            
3 Although ownership concentration is high in South Korean firms as compared to firms in the West, it is
similar to firms in other East Asian countries (See Claessens et. al. 1998a).  The leverage of South Korean
firms, however, is the highest among the 9 East Asian countries compared (Claessens et. al. 1998b).
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Equity Investment Total Net Wealth
 in Sister Firms  of the Group  Ratio
Hyundai 6.5 8.8 73.9%
Daewoo 5.2 13.6 38.2%
Samsung 3.6 14.8 24.3%
LG 4.4 8.5 51.8%
SK 3.1 8.2 37.8%
Total 22.8 53.9 42.3%
Source: The Korea Herald Internet Edition 8/27/99
*Book value as of 4/1/99.
Table 8. The Ratio of Equity Investment in Sister Firms in Top
 Five Korean Chaebol Groups to the Net Worth of the Groups 
(In trillions of won)
Let us now look at Daewoo as a detailed example.  The ownership structure of
Daewoo in 1988 is illustrated in Figure 1 (listed subsidiaries are marked).  As one can see
from the diagram, the control of the Daewoo group affiliates could be traced back to the
founder of the group, Kim Woo Choong, and the unlisted Daewoo Foundation, which
was also founded and controlled by Mr. Kim.  Interestingly, two of Daewoo’s biggest
businesses, Daewoo Motor and Daewoo Shipbuilding, were not separately listed.  Their
financial performances could only be partially inferred from the two listed firms: Daewoo
Corporation and Daewoo Heavy Industries, both of which held many subsidiaries in very
different industries.
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Daewoo
Foundation
Daewoo Corp.
(Listed)
Kim Woo Choong
Daewoo
Securities
(Listed)
Daewoo 
Investment
Finance Corp.
Chungbuk
 Bank
Daewoo
Shipbuilding
Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(Listed)
Zymos
Daewoo
Sikorsky
Pungkuk
Oil Co.
Daewoo
Electronic Parts
Other Daewoo
Group Co.’s
Daewoo
Electronics
(Listed)
Korea
Development
Bank
Korea
Steel Chemical
Daewoo Telecom
(Listed)
Daewoo Motor
Daewoo
Engineering
37.1%
32.9%
29.1%
16.7%
33.7%
45%
20%
50%
93%
15.9%
31.9%
10% 8.8%
11.6%
22%
26.7%
29.4%
50%
54.9%
3.1%
Figure 1.  Interlocking Patterns of Financial Control at Daewoo
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review (December 8, 1988), quoted from The Chaebol, Steers, Shin and Ungson, Harper & Row 1989.
It should be said that the ownership chart in Figure 1 is not exhaustive due to
incomplete information and disclosure.4  For example, we know that the unlisted Daewoo
Motor was held by many of Daewoo’s affiliates other than Daewoo Corporation.  When
Daewoo planned to sell Daewoo Motor during its liquidity crisis in July 1999, it was
disclosed that the Daewoo group as a whole held 93.5% of Daewoo Motor.  We also
know that the company founder Kim Woo Choong held large stakes in many of the
affiliates in addition to Daewoo Securities.
                                                            
4 South Koreans were allowed to engage in financial transactions in false names or borrowed names until
1993.  It was therefore difficult to obtain accurate financial data for corporations and individuals.
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3.  High degree of diversification within a chaebol group.  Table 9 shows the
extent of diversification of chaebols as compared to firms in advanced economies about
twenty years earlier.  Clearly, chaebols were more diversified than their counterparts in
those advanced economies.  One may argue that one chaebol group should not be treated
as a single firm because several affiliates in a chaebol group can be listed.  However,
according to an IMF report (Gobat 1998), of the total 819 companies affiliated with the
top 30 chaebols only one fifth were listed in 1996.  This fraction is certainly smaller in
the case of top 5 chaebols.
United West United
Types of Korea Japan States Germany France  Kingdom Italy
Diversification 1989 1973 1969 1970 1970 1970 1970
Specialized 8.2 16.9 6.2 22 16 6 10
Semi-specialized 28.6 36.4 29.2 22 32 34 33
Related 6.1 39.9 45.2 38 42 54 52
Unrelated 57.1 6.8 19.4 18 10 6 5
Source: Yoo and Lim(1999), Korean Development Institute
Reprinted from Republic of Korea: Selected Issues, Jeanne Gobat, 1998, IMF Staff Country Report
1/ Forty-nine chaebols for Korea, 118 firms for Japan, 100 firms for the other countries
Table 9. Korea---International Comparison of Diversification by Big Business 1/
(In percent)
More to the point I will make later are the following questions: Are chaebol
groups’ core businesses separately listed?  How focused are the listed firms?  We can
again use Daewoo as an example.  We know from Figure 1 that its core businesses,
automobile and shipbuilding, were not separately traded.  From the available information,
things have not changed much in recent years.  Of the four largest listed subsidiaries of
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the Daewoo group, Daewoo corporation and Daewoo Heavy Industries still acted as
holding companies of many different unlisted subsidiaries including Daewoo Motor.
While the listed Daewoo Electronics’ main products included TVs, VCRs, monitors,
refrigerators, microwaves, and washing machines, it in 1998 also held 5.3% stake in
Daewoo Heavy Industries, 23.7% in Daewoo Telecom, 3.9% in Daewoo Secutieis, and
100% in Daewoo Venture Capital (LG Securities 1999).  Daewoo Telecom, another large
listed company in the Daewoo group, held 8.5% of Daewoo Motor and 20.3% of Orion
Electric in 1998.  Therefore, the major listed firms of Daewoo group were highly
diversified.  And this is quite common among top chaebols due to the prevalence of
cross-shareholding among their subsidiaries.
In additions to the arguments made above, there is one very important reason to
doubt that the stock price of an independently listed chaebol affiliate can fairly reflect its
financial health. It is common knowledge that the effective family control of a chaebol
group’s affiliates also means that the group can engage in cross-unit financial assistance,
as profitable affiliates often extend financial aid to loss-making ones to keep the entire
group afloat.  Sometimes, this is done through cross-unit debt guarantees (see Table 10).
There is no reason to believe that the transactions between two nominally independent
affiliates of a group are arm’s-length.  This makes it very difficult for outsiders to assess
the financial health of individual units even when they are separately listed.  In fact,
several chaebols were investigated and fined recently for “illegal transactions” to their
affiliates even after these affiliates were formally separated from their parent chaebol
groups.   South Korean government recently has made “illegal inter-affiliate financial
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transactions” that are intended to keep weak affiliates afloat a major issue of chaebol
reforms (The Korea Herald 1999b).
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Stockholder's equity 35.2 42.8 50.7 62.9 70.5
Debt guarantee 165.5 110.7 82.1 67.5 64.9
Debt guarantee in
 percent of equity 469.8 258.1 161.9 107.3 92.2
Source: Fair Trade Commission; Reprinted from Republic of Korea: Selected Issues,
            Jeanne Gobat, 1998, IMF Staff Country Report
Table 10. Korea---Debt Guarantees of the Top 30 Chaebols
(In billions of won, unless otherwise stated)
4.  Development Stages and Knowledge about Productive Businesses
An efficient financial system should channel capital into the most productive
businesses.  The key issue here is: How do we know what businesses are the most
productive?  I argue that the knowledge about the productive businesses will have to be
acquired differently at different stages of development.  This has implications for the
structure of a financial system.
At the very early stage of economic development (corresponding to the 1960s in
South Korea) when the capital is scarce and there are few educated workers, it is
relatively easy to see what businesses will make money with low risk: labor-intensive
products with stable demand.  For example: textile products, footwear, and toys.  These
products have large global markets and provide stable revenues.  Everyone can see that
investment in them will yield high net present value (NPV) provided that labor costs are
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kept low.  This is not much uncertainty about if the investments have positive NPVs.  The
issue, therefore, is how to finance them.
As a country’s economy develops further, it makes more money and accumulates
more financial capital.  The country is likely to invest its additional financial resources
into capital-intensive businesses.  This corresponds to the period of High and Chemical
Industrialization Drive in South Korea in the 1970s when chaebols entered into
businesses such as shipbuilding, fertilizer, petrochemical, and steel.  Whether these
investments have positive NPVs is less apparent than before because the low labor cost
advantage is less important.  However, the uncertainty about the NPVs of these
investments is still low as long as there is not much uncertainty about the revenues and
the labor cost is still kept low.5  If this is the case, the government-directed financing
through bank loans can still be efficient.
As a country passed the two earlier stages of economic development discussed
above, its labor costs will have to rise due to more wealth being distributed to workers.
When the labor costs are higher compared to other underdeveloped countries (such as
China, which began its economic reforms in the late 70s and early 80s), the businesses
that were previously profitable are no longer competitive.  The country will have to
search for new, technologically advanced business opportunities.  This is the situation
faced by South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s.  Its chaebols invested heavily in industries
such as automobile, consumer electronics, semiconductor, and telecommunication.  The
demands and supplies for these products are more uncertain due to rapid technology
advances and/or product differentiation.  At the same time, production will rely on a more
17
educated labor force, which further increases the labor costs.  Therefore, the uncertainty
about the NPVs of these businesses is much higher now.  The knowledge about the NPVs
of these businesses is now more dispersed.  It is at this development stage that market
signals from security prices can be especially valuable in guiding the investments.
5. Financing the Obviously Good Projects in the Early Stage of Development
As we discussed in the previous section, it is easy for everyone to see that certain
projects have positive NPVs in the early stage of development.  The issue is how to
finance them.
Firms can of course finance these businesses by offering securities to investors
directly.  We know from Myers and Majluf (1984) that the costs of new equity offerings
or risky debt offerings are high when there is asymmetric information about firms’
existing asset value.  Good projects can be forfeited as a consequence.  It should be noted
that the adverse selection problem can exist with regard to the value of a firm’s existing
operation or the quality of the managers who run the operation, even when everyone
knows that certain new investment projects will definitely make money.6  This problem is
especially severe for countries in the early development stage with virtually no financial
infrastructures such as reliable auditing and disclosure and without a well-developed
managerial labor market.  This explains why the curb market interest rate is often
extremely high during the early stage of the economic development.  In the case of South
Korea, the real borrowing rate in the informal curb market between businesses is often in
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 It has been said that South Korea firms tend to enter industries whose products have the “near-
commodity” status in the earlier period of the development  (Steers et. al. 1989).   This is consistent with
the view that the demands for such products have low uncertainty because few innovations are expected.
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excess of 40% during the 1960s (see Table 11).  At these high rates, only the extremely
good projects will not be forfeited.
Inflation Time Bank loans Curb
Year (CPI) deposit* General NIF** Export market
1964 - 15 16 - 8 61.8
1965 - 30 26 - 6.5 58.9
1966 11.2 30 26 - 6 58.7
1967 10.9 30 26 - 6 56.7
1968 10.8 26 25.2 - 6 56
1969 12.3 24 24 - 6 51.4
1970 15.9 22.8 24 - 6 50.2
1971 13.5 22 22 - 6 46.4
1972 11.7 15 15.5 - 6 39
1973 3.1 12.6 15.5 - 7 33.2
1974 24.3 15 15.5 12 9 40.6
1975 25.3 15 15.5 12 9 47.9
1976 15.3 15.6 18 14 8 40.5
1977 10.1 15.8 16 14 8 38.1
1978 14.4 16.9 19 16 9 41.7
1979 18.3 14.4 19 16 9 42.4
1980 28.7 19.5 20 19.5 15 44.9
1981 21.3 16.2 17 17.5 15 35.3
1982 7.2 8 10 10 10 33.1
1983 3.4 8 10 10 10 25.8
1984 2.3 10 11.5 11.5 10 24.8
1985 2.5 10 11.5 11.5 10 24
1986 2.8 10 11.5 11.5 10 23.1
1987 3 10 11.5 11.5 10 22.2
1988 7.1 10 13 11.5 10 21.2
1989 5.7 10 12.5 11.5 10 18.9
1990 8.6 10 12.5 11.5 10 20.4
1991 9.3 10 12.5 11.5 10 21.2
Notes: * On-year time deposit at bank
           **National Investment Fund
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues,
              quoted from Cho and Kim, Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea.
Table 11. Intereste Rates, 1964~90
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 In order to reduce the problems of “taking money and running” or “unproven managers”, the loans will
typically have to be made to firms with existing operations.
19
One way to make sure that the good projects such as export projects are financed
is to provide firms with low interest rate debt financing that is tied to these projects.  The
private financial institutions will have no incentives to do this because they would lose
money due to the adverse selection problem.  The rate they are willing to lend is the curb
market rate.   Note that the welfare effects of the adverse selection problem and forfeiting
good projects are different.  The adverse selection problem is a zero sum game because it
transfers wealth from good firms to bad firms, whereas forfeiting good projects is an
efficiency loss.  If the government provides low interest rate financing tied to certain
projects, it can guarantee the financing of good projects, which increases efficiency.  The
loss on these loans due to the adverse selection problem can be compensated by taxation.
A numerical example of this argument is presented in the Appendix.
In South Korea the government owned banks in the 60s and 70s.  It therefore
controlled all lending rates and directed loans.  As one can see from Table 11, the real
borrowing rates on the loans tied to exports are mostly negative during the 60s and 70s.
Even the lending rates on general loans are substantially lower than the curb market rates.
Chaebols are the main beneficiaries of the low interest rate loans.  The low cost of bank
loans, however, contributed to high leverage ratios and high ownership concentration
because it discouraged firms from issuing new shares.
6.  Signals from Security Prices and Their Suppression under the Chaebol System
In this section, we discuss why signals from security prices can guide investment
at the more advanced stage of development and why the ownership structure and capital
structure of chaebols are not conducive to generating the price signals.
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For a technologically advanced product, its future demand and supply will depend
on consumers’ acceptance and the successes or failures of many apparent as well as
potential competitors.  Government regulations can also play an important role (such as
the law suite against Microsoft).  Therefore, no single person is likely to possess all the
information about the future demand and supply conditions, which are needed to estimate
the product’s profits.7  Moreover, one often cannot even predict who will happen to be in
the best position to collect the key information.  The knowledge about the business’ NPV
is dispersed.  The best way for the dispersed information to be credibly revealed is
through self-interested trading of the firm’s securities: anyone who has the information
can trade to make a profit.  The security prices can then be used to guide the firm’s
expansion or liquidation decisions.8  In the US, for example, a poor stock price
performance is often followed by the firm’s restructuring whereas rapid expansion can be
justified by skyrocketing stock prices.
The three characteristics of chaebols’ ownership and financial structure all act to
suppress the price signals.  The high ownership concentration and the high leverage ratio
with most debt not traded reduce the amount of equity traded in the market.  This reduced
equity base in turn reduces an informed trader’s trading profit and incentive because it is
more difficult to hide his trades. Consequently, less information is conveyed through
security prices.9  The third characteristics, the high degree of diversification of chaebols
and their listed firms, also makes traders who have information about one industry less
                                                            
7 If futures markets for the product at all dates were open, the information would be better revealed in the
futures prices.  Unfortunately, this is not the case for most products.
8 Hayek (1945) has made this point in a more general setting in order to show the virtue of a price system.
What I want to emphasize here is that information about technologically advanced products is even more
dispersed.
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likely to trade the stock of a firm that includes several other industries (see Chang and Yu
1999).
The South Korean government recognized in the 1980s that its policy of
controlling credit allocation needed reforms.  It denationalized major commercial banks
and gradually deregulated interest rates on loans and deposits.  It also tried to reduce the
bank loans to chaebols by redirecting new policy loans towards small and medium sized
enterprises.  These efforts, however, have not been enough to break the chaebols’
historical heavy dependence on loans from financial intermediaries.10  It is also possible
that externalities as discussed in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) have prevented
security markets from being fully developed.
It is interesting to note that high leverage and high ownership concentration are
also the characteristics of LBO firms in the USA.  It is often said that the LBO structure
is not appropriate for growth firms.  As we have argued, high leverage and high
ownership concentration may have worked well for Korean firms during their initial high
growth period.  This suggests what matters is not the growth rate per se.  Rather, it is the
dispersion of the knowledge about the product’s profitability.
7.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have used the South Korean experiences to argue that the
distribution of the knowledge about valuable businesses varies with the stage of
development.  This has implications for the design of financial system.  In the early
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 See Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) for a model in which ownership concentration reduces the information
conveyed in equity prices.  Although the information in their model is about managerial performance, it
could be changed to the information about future payoffs of the firm’s project.
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development stage when low labor cost is the main competitive advantage, it is easy for
everyone to see what businesses will create value.  A centralized financial system is not
likely to significantly misallocate resources.  In the more advanced development stage
when the labor cost advantage disappears and the knowledge about the technologically
advanced products becomes widely dispersed, a financial system that promotes security
trading is more likely to guide efficient resource allocation.
The policy implications of our analysis are as follows.  First, the government-
directed credit allocation can play a positive role in the early stage of development.
Second, the government should gradually withdraw from credit allocation as the labor
cost rises and firms move into businesses whose NPVs have higher uncertainty.  Third, at
the more advanced stage of development, the government should promote measures that
will improve the reliability of price signals such as disclosure.  The government should
discourage actions such as inter-affiliate transactions that are not done at the fair market
prices.
An important policy question that I have not addressed is: should the government
directly mandate the changes in ownership and capital structures?  Recently, the South
Korean Government has ordered the largest chaebols to reduce their debt-to-equity ratios
to below 200% by the yearend of 1999.  Is this a wise policy?  Two views in the literature
can shed light on this issue.  First, financial structures and system are determined by the
economic fundamentals.  They will change in response to economic development.  For
example, Boyd and Smith (1998) show that the optimal debt to equity ratio will fall as the
economy grows.  If this view is correct, the government should not intervene in the firm’s
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Banks may also be reluctant to reduce their lending to troubled chaebols because they are too big to be
failed.
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capital structure decisions.  The second view is that important informational externalities
exist in financial markets (Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999). Government intervention
may be needed for the initial development of an efficient financial market.  It is very
difficult if not impossible to judge which view applies to the case of South Korea more
accurately.  My hunch is that this particular government order to reduce leverage ratios is
likely to be harmful.
Although the viewpoint presented in this paper is based on the South Korean
experiences, it can also be relevant to other countries.  The Japanese keiretsu system
shared many characteristics with those of the South Korean chaebol.  One can make a
similar case for why the Japanese financial system was ill-equipped to deal with the
problems it faced in recent decades.  China has used South Korea as a model for its
development.  Even after the recent Asian crisis, it still views the chaebol system as
something it can learn from in reforming its state-owned enterprises.  As it is entering a
more advanced stage of economic development, China should recognize the financial
structures needed for this stage of development.
My argument is not one that is specifically designed to explain the causes of the
Asian financial crisis.  It does, however, point to one fundamental source of the crisis.
Currency speculation and short term foreign capital flows are, of course, the key
ingredients of the crisis.  Krugman (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) have presented
more detailed analysis on those factors.
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Appendix: An Example of How Policy Loans Can Improve Welfare
There is a class of projects called projects E in the economy.  All of them require I
in investment and have a NPV, v>0.  As discussed in the text, in the early stage of
economic development, these projects represent investing in products that have stable
external demands and can be produced at low labor costs.  Consequently, it is common
knowledge that these projects have positive NPVs.
To prevent “taking money and running” and to attract firms with proven success,
loans are made to firms with existing operations (but has no funds).  The value of its
existing operation is called a firm’s type and is denoted by t.
When a firm of type t undertakes a project E, the firm’s payoff will be t+e+v+I,
where e is a zero mean random variable, representing the risk of the existing operation.
When a firm does not have the project, its payoff is t+e. The type of a firm is privately
known to the firm.   Everything else is common knowledge.
To present a numerical example, let I=30, v=6, t is either 30 or 0 with equal
probability 0.5, and e is either 25 or –25 with equal probability 0.5.
Private Loan Market
We assume that the private lenders are competitive so that the loan payment
(principal plus interest) D is set so that the expected return to the lenders is 0.  It can be
shown that if both types of firms borrow, the loan payment D that makes the private
lenders break even will be D=36.3, implying a 21% interest rate.  At this rate, however,
the good type firm is better off not borrowing.  Therefore, only the bad firms will borrow
and undertake the projects E.  Given that only the bad firms borrow, the breakeven loan
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payment will be D=49, implying a 63% interest rate on the loan.  This rate could be
interpreted as the curb market rate (see Table 11).
By assuming that there are more projects E than the number of firms, some of the
projects are lost because half of the firms (good firms) do not undertake the projects
(alternatively, one can assume that the value of a project is higher if undertaken by a
good firm).  Therefore, there is a welfare loss under the private loan market arrangement
(it can be shown that there is similar welfare loss if private equity financing is used as in
Myers and Majluf 1985).
Policy Loans
The government can make zero-interest loans to the firms as long as the money is
used to fund a project E.  In this case, debt payment D=I=30 and both types of firms will
borrow.  The government can make up the loss by taxing all the profitable firms.  Note
that the government will only lose money on the loan to a bad firm when its e=-25 (the
loss is D-(L+e+I+v)=19).  This happens with probability 0.25.  The expected loss is 19/4.
If a fixed tax T is collected from profitable firms to finance the loss, then the expected tax
revenue will be 3T/4 because ¾ of the firms are profitable.  By equating the expected loss
to expected revenue, we have T=19/3 = 6.3.
In this case all the firms will take on the valuable projects and there is a welfare
improvement.
